In this paper, we study the determinants of the automobile production in Mexico. We find a significant positive (negative) impact of Mexican demand (costs). US variables have nuanced effects. Moreover, we find a positive (negative) impact of Mexican relative demand (costs) on the Mexican production share -regarding Mexican and US ones.
Introduction
In December 1992, Canada, Mexico and the USA signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect on 1 January 1994. It is the first formal regional integration agreement involving both developed and developing countries. This regional integration implies the reduction and the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, as well as a general deregulation and strengthening of competition. Restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) were eased and the financial sector reformed. This new environment and, in particular, the increased exposure to foreign competition on the home market and abroad provided an important stimulus for foreign direct investment. Indeed, the bringing into force of NAFTA seems to have a positive incidence on the American investment flows inwards in Mexico (Stevens (1998) ).
The existing theoretical literature on economic integration and FDI deals with the question of whether regional integration agreements (RIAs), by eliminating trade barriers, promote FDI flows. Regional integration creates a larger market which allows some firms to grow larger and stronger than what would have been possible in individual national markets. The main benefits of integration is to make the region more attractive towards location, which should stimulate intra-regional FDI as well as inflows from the rest of the world. Norman and Motta (1996) found that increased market accessability prompts outside firms to invest in the regional block, reducing product prices, profits of intra-block firms and increasing total surplus. Integrating economies are more likely to gain from improving intra-regional market accessability than from tougher external trade policy, and may wish to offer investment incentives to encourage FDI by outside firms. Norman and Motta (1993) analysed the effects of the creation of free trade area (FTA) between Eastern European countries on external firms strategies in supplying these markets. They showed that both market growth and improved market accessability lead the external firms to switch from exporting to FDI.
Most of theoretical papers deal with effects on FDI of regional integration between countries at the same stage of development. In this context, Montout and Zitouna (2002) developed a theoretical model based on FDI motives described in Neary (2002) . The stress was put on north-south FTAs characteristics, notably wage differences and the possibility of FDI by firms originating from the area. Results suggest:
• A traditional result in multinational firms strategies models : the tariff-jumping motive to FDI holds if transaction costs (including transport and trade barriers) are important relative to additional fixed costs associated to investing abroad.
• Export platform strategy holds if foreign firms choose to locate in the low wage country in order to re-export. This motive depends on wage and trade barriers differences. The more these differences important are, the more likely foreign firms use this strategy when intra regional trade costs fall (countries becoming more and more integrated).
• When analysing the influences of domestics firms strategies on foreign ones, an eviction effect may exist. It results from insiders relocation in the low wages country which reduces the market accessibility advantages of investing there for outsiders. Empirical studies found a positive incidence of regional integration on FDIs. Yannopoulos (1990) highlighted the significant growth of intra-regional FDI flows in the European Union.
Moreover, Dunning (1997) demonstrated the positive incidence of EU on the inter-and intracapital flows. In addition, a sectoral analysis on the England agro-food industry by Morgan and Wakelin (2001) emphasized the increase of foreign and domestic investment in this sector. Girma (2002) examines the determinants of FDI location choices in the UK using disaggregated data for manufacturing industry between 1981 and 1991. He concluded that opportunities created by regional integration deepening have changed the FDI flows determinants.
Furthermore, Blonigen and Feenstra (1996) underlined the crucial role of protectionist threat and the existence of tariff barriers. The FDI inflows from outsiders into the region could obviously go up if the average level of protection increases as a result of the free trade area.
Moreover, the raise in fears about future protection implies the same outcome. In the same way, Barrel and Pain (1999) found that Japanese investment flows in European countries were influenced by trade barriers. Blomström and Kokko (1997) analysed in detail the incidence of north American integration on FDIs. They consider that 'the stronger the environmental change connected with regional integration and the stronger locational advantages of the individual country or industry, the more likely it is that integration agreement will lead to inflows of FDI from the outside as well as from the rest of the integrating region' They highlight differences in structures of regional blocs by distinguishing north-north (Canada and US) and north-south regional integration (the inclusion of Mexico). On the one hand, the former agreement had a negligent impact on FDI flows. On the other hand, the latter had a significant incidence on inward foreign investment flows in Mexico.
In this paper, our aim is twofold : first, we study the determinants of the automobile production in Mexico. We find a significant positive (negative) impact of Mexican demand (costs). United States variables have nuanced effects. Moreover, we find positive (negative) impact of Mexican relative demand (costs) on the Mexican production share regarding Mexican and US ones. Second, we examine the effects of the creation of NAFTA on firms operating in the automobile sector. We find a positive impact on the production of outsiders in Mexico and no significant impact on insiders. Furthermore, it affected positively the Mexican share of the production of either insiders and outsiders, suggesting that, all else equal, it promoted relocation of automobile production in Mexico. Finally, we found that NAFTA affected firms strategies in 1991 for insiders and 1992 for outsiders.
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows : section 2 describes the policy framework governing the automotive sector in the NAFTA; in section 3, we develop some stylized facts on the automobile industry in NAFTA; and we present the econometric study and results in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The automotive regime in the NAFTA area The local content requirements have encouraged the final auto-makers to be directly involved in the domestic production of auto parts and to develop suppliers networks regionally.
In addition, the North American Free Trade Agreement substantially liberalizes the North American investment regimes. The agreement establishes a clear, rules-based framework for the impartial treatment of FDI and places strict limit upon the use of performance requirements.
The national treatment provisions constitute the conceptual cornerstone of NAFTA. Several provisions of the agreement, however, move beyond national treatment either by establishing common norms for the treatment of FDI among the three signatories, or through the adoption of measures based upon reciprocity. The new environment characterized by security, stability and by a drastic reduction of tariffs on regionally originating goods may influence the location strategies of firms. As a matter of fact, US transnational corporations will be encouraged to rationalize the organization of their north American operations and to increase foreign direct investment in Mexico. Nevertheless, some industries, such as automobiles will be protected from the import competition by strict rules of origin. The principal aims of NAFTA investment provisions are to create an integrated north American market. 95 per cent of the production (see Table1). Moreover, the data illustrate the predominant presence of US firms in Mexico until 1997. During this period, they realize, in mean, more than 60 per cent of total production. The substantial modifications in this industry result mainly from investments engaged by Chrysler, Ford and General Motors.
[ Table 1 about in NAFTA is done with USA 1 . That is why we do not take into account Canadian production, demand and production costs.
Thus, the location of firms in Mexico seems to be motivated by the proximity to the USA in addition to the advantages of Mexico in terms of labour costs. Therefore, this automobile production is essentially influenced by the strategies of multinationals firms benefiting from Mexican low wage costs, Mexican market size and proximity to the US market.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
Econometric study
The North American Free Trade Agreement being a north-south regional integration, may affect the production and the location strategies of multinational firms (MNFs). Moreover, the outcome could be different depending on the origin of the firm : insider or outsider to the to trade area. In our econometric model, our objectives are:
• We test whether automobile production in Mexico is affected by production costs differential between Mexico and the USA. Does Mexican and US costs affect automobile production in Mexico? In fact, firms may be incited to locate in the low wages country in order to export to the largest market.
• Do Mexican or/and US sectoral demand play a role in determining output of automobile producers in Mexico? It permits us to evaluate the importance of Mexican demand relative to the US one in determining automobile production in Mexico.
• We see if NAFTA contributed to the increase (decrease) of the production of foreign (local) firms. By foreign firms, we mean outsiders.
• We check if NAFTA affected the location choice of MNFs production between the USA and Mexico. Is there a substitution between both alternative locations?
Data and variables
In order to better explain firm strategies, we use firm data on automobiles produced in Mexico and the USA between 1983 and 1999 : 40 firms produce automobiles in Mexico and/or at least for two years in the considered period. Demand, production costs and regional integration variables are integrated in the econometric model to explain production and location strategies of MNFs (see Table 2 for a description of variables and data sources).
[ Table 2 about here.]
Endogenous variable
As a dependant variable, we take the volume and the share of production per firm in Mexico.
We have information only on final goods. To our knowledge, no data is available on parts and components production in Mexico.
Explanatory variables
Mexican output volume is supposed to be partially explained by the production of the same firm in the USA (P U S ). In fact, in addition to demand and costs considerations, the production of the same firm in the USA gives us information about the evolution and the strategy of the multinational firm as a whole. If they are positively correlated, it may illustrate their whole situation: if a firm is declining (growing), it decreases (increases) its production in all locations, then reduces (raises) its production in Mexico abstracting from all other considerations. A positive sign may also explain the strategy of 'diversification' of the firm. Firms can specialize in the production of a variety in the USA and another one in Mexico. On the other hand, if production in the USA affects negatively the Mexican production of the same firm, it illustrates a substitution of the two locations. In this case, firms favour one location which explains the export platform strategy. For example, until 1987 Volkswagen produced 45 per cent of its north American output in Mexico. Since 1988, it produces only in Mexico.
We assume that individual production in Mexico and the Mexican share of the north American output are influenced by both demand variables and production costs.
Demand : The American and Mexican market size may affect positively the automobile production in Mexico. We approximate the Mexican and US demand by a sectoral variable (dregMex and dregUS ): differences between registrations in the considered year with registrations in the previous year. However, if there is substitution relation between Mexican and US locations, an increase in the US demand may have no effect on the production in Mexico. Besides, in the second regression taking Mexican production share as endogenous variable, a positive effect of Mexican (US) demand would mean that a marginal increase in the Mexican (US) demand affects more Mexican production than the US one.
Costs :
Previous empirical analysis concerning FDI inward in developing countries put the stress on differential in wage costs between the developing and developed economies (Woodward and Rolfe (1993) ). The low wage costs represent a considerable advantage for attracting foreign investors (Klayman (1994) ). In the same way, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) show the positive correlation between wage costs of home countries of MNFs located in Mexico and investment flows at the benefit of maquiladoras. Thus, large wages differential between developing and developed countries involved in a regional trade agreement incite foreign firms to locate in the former (Thomas and Grosse (2001) ). Therefore the incidences of US wages in addition to Mexican ones seem to be a relevant analysis.
We consider US (wages U S ) and Mexican wages (wages M ex ) at the sectoral level. The former (latter) is expected to have a positive (negative) effect on the Mexican production: an increase in wage differences incites the firms to produce relatively more in Mexico. In order to take into account the differences in qualifications, we correct nominal wages by incorporating Mexican and US productivity per employee. The productivity is measured as production per worker in the automobile sector. Regional integration Regional integration is approximated by dummy variables because of the non-availability of data about trade barriers. We distinguish the incidence of the creation of NAFTA on domestic (N AF T A loc ) and foreign firms (N AF T A f or ) located in Mexico. It equals one for local (foreign) firm from the date of the creation of NAFTA, and zero otherwise.
Regressions
In our database, for almost 50 per cent of observations, there is no production in Mexico. This information is important since it illustrates location strategies of firms: producing in Mexico and/or in the USA. That is why we use a Tobit model. This model takes into account the values equal to zero in the dependent variable.
In the first regressions (Table 3) , we run a Tobit without any panel analysis. In the first model, the dependent variable is the volume of automobile production in Mexico (per firm).
In the second, we took the Mexican share, regarding US and Mexican ones, of automobile production (per firm).
[ Table 3 
about here.]
In the first model, the sign associated with the US production is positive and significant, which illustrates a positive and dependent correlation between the US and Mexican output in this industry. Demand variables are not significant. Neither Mexican nor US demand had an effect on the production of automobiles in Mexico. On the cost side, neither Mexican nor US wages are significant. Finally, it seems that NAFTA had an impact on local firms' production only. Thus, regional integration contributed to the growth of insiders output and had no effect on outsiders' output.
The results of demand, costs and NAFTA variables have qualitatively similar effects on production in Mexico and the distribution of production between the USA and Mexico (model 2 in Table 3 ).
We have to be cautious with these results because of the existence of a strong heterogeneity between firms. That is why we include firms' fixed effects in next regressions (Table 4 ).
In the first model (volume of Mexican production as a dependent variable), the volume of US production has no more significant effect. Giving the dualistic productive structure between largest constructors which concentrate more than 90 per cent of production and the others, representing small productive units, the equation without fixed effects biased the results. In fact, production in Mexico is not affected by the production of the same firm in the USA.
The Mexican demand variable has a positive and significant effect. This result sheds light on the importance of the Mexican market in determining the volume of automobile production in Mexico. However, US demand has no significant effect. Cost variables are both significant.
As expected, Mexican (US) wages have a negative (positive) incidence. Thus, the higher the wages differential is, the more firms are incited to produce in Mexico. Recall that, if we do not correct wages by the productivity, results will be different. In fact, by doing so, we found a positive effect of Mexican wages which reflects an increase in productivity per employee and obviously not an increase in costs for firms.
Turning to the effects of NAFTA on insiders and outsiders, we found a positive impact on the latter meaning that, all else being equal, the creation of this regional integration attracted foreign investors in this industry, whereas, there is no incidence on the production of insiders.
[ Table 4 about here.]
The aim of the second model is to emphasize the location choices between Mexico and the USA. Mexican relative demand regarding the US demand seems to affect positively the share of automobile production in Mexico relative to the production in the USA and Mexico. On the cost side, Mexican relative costs regarding the US costs have a negative effect on the Mexican share of output. This result illustrates the important role of differences in production costs in determining the location of automobiles firms.
Finally, NAFTA had a significant and positive impact on both local and foreign firms' Mexican shares. So, abstracting for demand and cost considerations, NAFTA modified the production structure of either insiders and outsiders. In fact, NAFTA increased Mexican production relatively more than US production in the automobile industry. Now, we try to see in which year NAFTA really had an impact on the distribution of automobile production between Mexico and the USA. By doing so, we check whether firms anticipated gains resulting from improved market accessability. In fact, In model 2, we chose 1993 as a reference year. We ran different models and found that, for insiders, 1991 is the first year for which NAFTA had a significant and positive impact, whereas for outsiders it is 1992 (model 3).
Conclusion
In this paper, we employ Tobit estimates in order to study the determinants of automobile production in Mexico. Moreover, we assess the effects of the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the strategies of MNFs by distinguishing insiders and outsiders to the area.
We find a significant positive (negative) impact of Mexican demand (costs). United States variables have nuanced effects. Moreover, we find a positive (negative) impact of Mexican relative demand (costs) on the Mexican production share regarding Mexican and US ones.
By examining the effects of the creation of NAFTA on firms operating in the automobile sector, we find a positive impact on the production of outsiders in Mexico and no significant impact on insiders.
Furthermore, NAFTA affected positively the Mexican share of the production of both insiders and outsiders, suggesting that, all else being equal, it promoted relocation of automobile production in Mexico.
Finally, we found that NAFTA affected firms strategies in 1991 for insiders and 1992 for outsiders, meaning that firms anticipate trade policies. Figure 1: The Mexican production in the automobile industry by country of origin of firms (calculations made by authors from STAN OECD, 1983 − 99) Regional integration N AF T A loc A dummy for regional integration for non NAFTA firms =1 for NAFTA firms after NAFTA N AF T A f or A dummy for regional integration for non NAFTA firms =1 for non-NAFTA firms after NAFTA (2) 28.79 13.86 Prob>chi(2) 0.0002 0.0078 Pseudo R2 0.0230 0.0100 Note: Standard errors in parenthesis with *, ** and *** denoting significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels. (2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Pseudo R2 0.5681 0.4381 0.4339 Note: Standard errors in parenthesis with *, ** and *** denoting significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels.
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